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WHITHER (WITHER?) GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS? THE CASE
AGAINST GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AND FOR
APPELLATIONS OF ORIGIN IN AN ERA OF GLOCALIZATION
BENJAMIN ROBERT HOPPER1
ABSTRACT
One of the most hotly contested legal debates in international
intellectual property law today concerns geographical indications (GIs)
and appellations of origin (AOOs), referred to herein using the umbrella
term “indication of origin” (IO). Central to the debate are two different
systems for IOs—the sui generis system of AOOs and the like promoted by
IO advocates like the EU (generally civil law jurisdictions) and the system
promoted by IO skeptics like the US (generally common law jurisdictions)
under which GIs are subsumed within a pre-existing trademark system.
These divergent IO systems are manifestations of deepening fragmentation
in the international IO order, which has led to a deadlock in international
IO law. Although key international agreements dealing with IOs have
sought to “bridge the gap” between the two systems by permitting
signatories to protect IOs under either system, this article finds that there is
an inherent, irreconcilable tension between the two systems, making the
gap unbridgeable. The article concludes that it is in the interests of all that
a sui generis and limited system of AOO protection be adopted within an
international, harmonized framework. By contrast, trademark-based GIs
ought to be allowed to wither on the vine.

1. LL.M. (Harvard University); J.D. and B.A. Arts (Hons.) (University of Melbourne). Admitted
to the Supreme Court of Victoria and High Court of Australia. Email: benrhopper@gmail.com. I would
like to thank Professor Ruth Okediji and Diana Liebenau for their encouragement and comments, Bryan
Helwig for his guidance as article editor, and the staff at the Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual
Property for their professionalism and support. I am responsible for any mistakes in this article.
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PART I: INTRODUCTION
I.A: The GI vs. AOO debate
One of the most hotly contested legal debates in international
intellectual property law today concerns geographical indications (GIs) and
appellations of origin (AOOs),2 referred to herein using the umbrella term
“indication of origin” (IO). A review of international agreements
concerning IOs, and the different mechanisms by which countries seek to
provide for their protection, reveals fragmentation. The source of this
fragmentation may be located in the ever-widening disjuncture between the
nation and state in “nation-state” and global struggles between emigrants
and “stay-at-homes” over narratives of national identity. The debate over
IOs is thus a manifestation of glocalization—the simultaneous pressures
exerted by local and global tendencies.
Central to the debate are two different systems for IOs—the sui
generis system of AOOs and the like promoted by IO advocates like the
European Union (the EU) (generally civil law jurisdictions) and the system
promoted by IO skeptics like the United States (the US) (generally
common law jurisdictions) under which IOs are subsumed within a preexisting trademark system. Although key international agreements dealing
with IOs have sought to “bridge the gap” between the two systems by
permitting signatories to protect IOs under either system, this article finds
that there is an inherent, irreconcilable tension between the two systems,
making the gap unbridgeable. The article concludes that it is in the interests
of all that a sui generis and limited system of AOO protection tethered
closely to the land be adopted within an international, harmonized
framework. Indeed, this is the only practical normative basis on which
AOOs can and should be based without doing undue harm to pre-existing
trademark and common language rights. Further, it may well break the
deadlock in negotiations between IO proponents and opponents.

2. Cf. Kal. Raustiala & Stephen R. Munzer, The Global Struggle over Geographic Indications,
18 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 337 (2007); Burkhart Goebel & Manuela Groeschl, The Long Road to Resolving
Conflicts between Trademarks and Geographical Indications, 104 TRADEMARK REP 829, at 830
(2014); and Anselm Kamperman Sanders, Geographical Indications of Origin: When GIs Become
Commodities, All Gloves Come Off, 46 IIC - INT. REV. INTELLECT. PROP. COMPET. L. 755, at 755
(2015).
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I.B: Structure of article and outline of arguments
After clarifying some important definitional matters, I provide an
overview of the current international agreements concerning IO protection
in Part II.
Part III outlines the “economic geography” of IO protection, noting in
particular the, if not diametrically opposed, then certainly fragmented and
fragmenting positions adopted and pushed by different countries (this is my
first argument that there is deepening fragmentation in the international IO
order). It also notes the historical/cultural, economic, and political
underpinnings to those positions (this is my second argument that the
fragmentation is not merely philosophical/systemic, but erupts from the
widening hyphen between nation and state in “nation-state”).
Part IV sets out my third argument that, upon proper scrutiny, the
theoretical justifications for IOs and their closest cousin in the intellectual
property family, trademarks, clash in a manner that is irreconcilable. In
particular, the cognate key tenets of trademark law of distinctiveness and
“genericide” cannot be reconciled with IO’s protection for place names and
refusal to accept the consequences of “genericide”. “Genericide” refers to a
trademark owner losing their exclusive rights because their trademark has
become generic, i.e., becomes the commonly used sign for a good or
service (e.g., “Kleenex”).
In Part V, I set out my fourth argument that the theoretical
justifications for IOs are not solely to be found in traditional theories of
intellectual property, but also in a cultural heritage theory grounded in the
protection, maintenance and sharing of cultural heritage. Thus, irrespective
of whether or not an IO becomes a common descriptive term or could be
used in an arbitrary or fancy fashion that would not cause consumer
confusion, it should be reserved for the current occupants of the particular
place whose name forms the IO. This is subject to the proviso that the IO
retain an intimate connection to its indicated land. After all, an IO is not
alienable in the sense that a trademark is. For example, a trademark may
pass hands from a producer in the US to a producer in the Philippines, as
may production of the good to which the trademark is attached. However,
an IO is (or should be, I contend) tethered to the land—like an easement, it
should “run with the land”. “Tethered to the land” refers to the extent to
which the IO evokes a particular geographical location.
This leads me to conclude in Part VI that the best path forward is for
an international agreement to be signed (or a pre-existing agreement
amended) requiring member countries to provide sui generis AOO
protection for goods whose qualities are indeed “essentially [i.e.,
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necessarily, inextricably] attributable”3 to their geographical origin by
requiring them to be, or to use, raw materials from that origin and, if made
from raw materials, so made using local knowledge. By contrast,
trademark-based GIs ought to be allowed to wither on the vine.
I.C: Definitional matters
GIs and AOOs – clarifying the distinction
Due in no small part to the contest over the proper contents of GIs and
AOOs, there is much confusion in the literature concerning their
definitional boundaries, and delineating the distinction between the two can
be elusive. For example, one commentator seeks to distinguish GIs from
AOOs on the basis that “[w]hile geographical indications typically obtain
their name from their geographical location. . .appellations of origin derive
their special qualities from the geographical environment where the good
is produced”.4 The practical effect of the distinction between “geographical
location” and “geographical environment” is not immediately apparent –
the names of both are generally the same or, at least, the indications for
both are geographical names (and it is only the name that a GI/AOO
protects, not the underlying knowledge, technology, terrestrial features,
etc.). Nonetheless, the distinction does seek to grasp at the root of the
matter – the degree of intimacy between the name/indication and the land.
As the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) states, “[t]he
basic difference between the two concepts is that the link with the place of
origin must be stronger in the case of an appellation of origin.”5
Bernard O’Connor helpfully elucidates the concept of IOs as follows:
in contrast to a trademark, “[a] geographical indication is linked. . .to
something more than mere human creativity including topography, climate
or other factors independent from human creativity. Therefore, the link
between the product and its geographical origin cannot be broken and no
delocalization of production is possible. . .whereas trademarks put
emphasis on the producer of a product, a geographical indication

3. WORLD TRADE ORG., AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS (signed on April 15, 1994), at art. 22(1), http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/1996/TS0010.pdf
(last visited Dec. 3, 2016) (emphasis added).
4. Danielle Dudding, The Lisbon Agreement: Why the United States Should Stop Fighting the
Geneva Act, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 167, at 172 (2015).
5. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., Frequently Asked Questions: Geographical Indications,
http://www.wipo.int/geo_indications/en/faq_geographicalindications.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
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underlines the geographical origin of a good and the characteristics that
are derived therefrom.”6
Herein, unless otherwise indicated, I define GIs consistently with the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property agreement (TRIPS) as:
“indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a
Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality,
reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to
its geographical origin.”7 However, I define an AOO consistently with the
definition in the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of
Origin and their International Registration (as amended on September 28,
1979) (Lisbon Agreement) as: “the geographical denomination of a
country, region, or locality, which serves to designate a product
originating therein, the quality or characteristics of which are due
exclusively or essentially to the geographical environment, including
natural and human factors.”8 To further clarify the distinction between GIs
and AOOs, I specify that (i) a GI may or may not be toponymic and may be
registered under a trademark or a sui generis registration system; and (ii) an
AOO is toponymic and is registered under a sui generis registration system.
An example of a GI is “feta”. The etymology of “feta” lies in “fetta”,
being the Italian for “slice”, which, in turn, stems from the Latin “offa”,
meaning “morsel” or “piece”.9 Therefore, it is not a toponym, but derives
from an everyday word. Nonetheless, it bears a historical association with a
particular region (Greece) that produces white cheese using specific
ingredients according to a particular process.10 An example of an AOO is
“Champagne”, which is a sparkling wine from the Champagne region of
France using grapes grown in that region. 11
The exceptions to using “GI” and “AOO” as defined above are:
Part VI, wherein I argue for a more restrictive definition of AOO and,
where I use “GI” or “AOO” in the context of a particular agreement, I
6. BERNARD O’CONNOR, THE LAW OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, at 113 (2004). Note: in this
quote, “geographical indication” may be understood as equivalent in meaning to “IO” as used in this
article.
7. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 3 (TRIPS), at art. 22(1).
8. Note: As will become apparent from the discussion below, in particular, Part VI wherein I set
out my proposed definition of an AOO, I consider it doubtful that the geographical denomination of a
country should form an AOO. Nonetheless, for the sake of clarity, I use this established definition of an
AOO from the Lisbon Agreement as my starting point.
9. Douglas
Harper,
fetta
(n.),
ONLINE
ETYMOLOGY
DICTIONARY,
http://etymonline.com/index.php?term=fetta&allowed_in_frame=0 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
10. See Bernard O’Connor & Irina Kireeva, What’s in a Name? The “Feta” Cheese Saga, 9 INT.
TRADE L. REGUL. 110, at 110, 116-17 (2003).
11. See Daniel J. Gervais, Irreconcilable Differences? The Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement
and the Common Law, 53 HOUST. L. REV. 339, at 342 n.7 (2015).
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intend for those acronyms to have the meanings they are given in that
agreement. To avoid confusion, rather than using “GI” as “an umbrella
term whose overall purpose is to distinguish the identification of a
product’s origin and its link with particular characteristics related to that
origin,”12 I use the neologism “indicium originis” or “indication of origin”
or “IO” to denote the “family” within which the “species” of GIs and
AOOs fall.
Trademarks
I define a trademark quite simply as a sign used in the course of trade
to distinguish one person’s goods and/or services from that of another. 13
PART II: INTERNATIONAL IO AGREEMENTS – A STORY OF
FRAGMENTATION
II.A: Early agreements
The history of international indicium originis law reveals a pattern of
increased protection for indications of origin, alongside increased
confusion concerning the ontological nature of these indications.
The first mention of subject matter akin to indicia originis in a
multilateral treaty was the watershed Paris Convention on Industrial
Property (Paris Convention) (1883).14 While the Paris Convention
mentioned “indication of source” (“indication de provenance”), the term
was left undefined, and only limited protection against false indications of
source was provided for. 15 The Paris Convention’s protection against false
indications of source has been expanded somewhat since 1883. Thus, the
current incarnation of the Paris Convention (as amended in 1979) includes
protection against “direct or indirect use of a false indication of the source
of the goods or the identity of the producer, manufacturer, or merchant.”16
12. Daniele Giovannucci, Tim Josling, William Kerr, Bernard O'Connor & May T. Yeung, GUIDE
TO GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS: LINKING PRODUCTS AND THEIR ORIGINS, at xiii (2009).

13. Compare WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 3 (TRIPS), at art. 15(1).
14. MICHAEL BLAKENEY, THE PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, at 10 (2014);
Raustiala and Munzer, supra note 2, at 344.
15. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., CONVENTION DE PARIS POUR LA PROTECTION DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ
INDUSTRIELLE (DU 20 MARS 1883) [PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY
(OF
MARCH
20,
1883)],
at
art.
10,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=287780 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
16. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY (AS AMENDED ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1979), at arts. 9 and 10(1),
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=287556 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016); Raustiala
and Munzer, supra note 2, at 344; MICHAEL BLAKENEY, supra note 11, at 344.
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Increased protection for indications of origin came in the form of the
Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of
Source on Goods (1891) (Madrid Agreement), under which parties agree
to prohibit the importation of “[a]ll goods bearing a false or deceptive
indication by which one of the countries to which this Agreement applies,
or a place situated therein, is directly or indirectly indicated as being the
country or place of origin.”17 Of note was art. 4 on genericide of
indications of origin, which allowed the courts of member countries to
determine what appellations, on account of their generic character, fall
outside the agreement. “[R]egional appellations concerning the source of
products of the vine” were, however, carved out from art. 4. In a harbinger
of future IO disputes, this carve-out was apparently the reason why major
trading nations (the US, Germany and Italy) did not accede to the Madrid
Agreement.18
II.B: Lisbon Agreement and Geneva Act
The Lisbon Agreement provides stronger protection for indications of
origin than any other multilateral treaty.19 The agreement obliges its
members, who form the Lisbon Union,20 to protect in their territories “the
appellations of origin of products” of signatory countries, “recognized and
protected as such in the country of origin” and registered at the
International Bureau of WIPO.21 Foreshadowing the heightened protection
for wine and spirit IOs under TRIPS, 22 the Lisbon Agreement requires that
protection be ensured “against any usurpation or imitation, even if the true
origin of the product is indicated or if the appellation is used in translated
form or accompanied by terms such as “kind,” “type,” “make,”
“imitation”, or the like.”23
No common law jurisdiction (apart from Israel) has acceded to the
Lisbon Agreement, which only has 28 contracting parties. 24 The Geneva
17. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., ARRANGEMENT DE MADRID CONCERNANT LA RÉPRESSION DES
FAUSSES INDICATIONS DE PROVENANCE SUR LES MARCHANDISES (1891) [MADRID AGREEMENT FOR THE
REPRESSION OF FALSE OR DECEPTIVE INDICATIONS OF SOURCE ON GOODS (1891)], at art. 1,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=281783 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
18. BLAKENEY, supra note 14, at 12.
19. Dudding, supra note 4, at 182.
20. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., LISBON AGREEMENT FOR THE PROTECTION OF APPELLATIONS OF
ORIGIN AND THEIR INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION (AS AMENDED ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1979), at
art. 1(1), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=285838 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
21. Id. at art. 1(2).
22. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 3 (TRIPS), at art. 23.
23. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., supra note 20 (Lisbon Agreement), at art. 3.
24. WORLD
INTELL.
PROP.
ORG.,
WIPO-Administered
Treaties,
WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=10 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016). As
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Act of the Lisbon Agreement on Appellations of Origin and Geographical
Indications (as adopted on May 20, 2015) (Geneva Act) emerged from a
review of the Lisbon system with a view to making it more attractive to
users and potential new members. 25 However, if the intent of the Geneva
Act was to make the Lisbon system palatable to countries that protect
indications of origin under a trademark system, rather than sui generis
system of AOO protection, it appears that the intent has not been realized. 26
At least two fundamental elements of a trademark-based system for
indications of origin raise issues in terms of compatibility with the Geneva
Act. These are, first, the “use” doctrine (a trademark owner only has rights
over a sign for the goods/services in respect of which they use the sign, and
may lose exclusive rights to the trademark in respect of some or all of those
goods/services if they abandon it or acquiesce in another’s use for a
sufficient length of time) and, second, the cognate doctrine of genericide.
Standing in marked tension with the use doctrine, art. 11 of the
Geneva Act replaces the right against usurpation of the Lisbon Agreement
with a “TRIPS Plus” three-limbed right that members are required to
furnish, namely the right to prevent:
(a) use of an AOO or GI (as defined in the Geneva Act at art. 2(1)(i)
and art. 2(1)(ii), respectively):27
(i) in respect of goods of the same kind as those to which the
AOO or GI applies; or
of December 3, 2016 the contracting parties to the Lisbon Agreement are: Algeria, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, France, Gabon, Georgia, Haiti, Hungary, Iran, Israel, Italy, Mexico, Montenegro,
Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Slovakia, the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Togo, and Tunisia.
25. Int'l Trademark Ass'n, New Act of the Lisbon Agreement Encompasses All Geographical
Indications, Allows Accession by Regional Organizations, 70 INTA BULL. 11 (June 15, 2015),
http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/LisbonAgreement_7011.aspx (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
26. Cf. Gervais, supra note 11; Int'l Trademark Ass'n, supra note 25.
27. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., GENEVA ACT OF THE LISBON AGREEMENT ON APPELLATIONS OF
ORIGIN AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS (adopted on May 20, 2015), at arts. 2(1)(i) and 2(1)(ii),
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=370115 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016). The full
text of these articles is: “This Act applies in respect of:
(i)
any denomination protected in the Contracting Party of Origin consisting of or
containing the name of a geographical area, or another denomination known as referring
to such area, which serves to designate a good as originating in that geographical area,
where the quality or characteristics of the good are due exclusively or essentially to the
geographical environment, including natural and human factors, and which has given the
good its reputation; [AOO] as well as
(ii)
any indication protected in the Contracting Party of Origin consisting of or containing
the name of a geographical area, or another indication known as referring to such area,
which identifies a good as originating in that geographical area, where a given quality,
reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its
geographical origin. [GI]”.
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(ii) in respect of goods or services not of the same kind as those
to which the AOO or GI applies, if such use would suggest
a connection with the AOO or GI beneficiaries and be likely
to damage their interests, or, “where applicable”, if the use
would be “likely to impair or dilute in an unfair manner, or
take unfair advantage of” the GI’s reputation,
in both cases, even if the AOO or GI is used in translated form or
is accompanied by terms such as “style”, “kind”, “type”, “make”,
“imitation”, “method”, “as produced in”, “like”, “similar”; and
(b) “any other practice liable to mislead consumers as to the true
origin, provenance or nature of the goods.”
The Geneva Act has thereby secured the indication of origin
protection that the pro-IO countries have been unable to agree through the
TRIPS council at the World Trade Organization (WTO) (see discussion in
Part II.C below). As Daniel Gervais writes, “the Geneva Act is a de facto
expansion by (and for) the Lisbon Members of GI protection to goods other
than wines and spirits—a measure sought by many WTO Members,
especially in the developing world.”28
It is not possible to reconcile art. 12 of the Geneva Act with the
doctrine of genericide in trademark law. This doctrine is premised on the
belief that, once a trademark has become generic, it is part of the commons,
free for all to use like any dictionary word. However, art. 12 prevents a
party from considering a registered AOO or GI as having become generic
as long as it remains protected in the country of origin. As Gervais has
explained,29 this is an extraordinary manifestation of lex originis in
international intellectual property law, where a key governing principle is
that of territoriality (i.e., substantive rights are national in nature). 30
In addition to expanding the level of protection enjoyed by indicia
originis, the Geneva Act has expanded the protected subject matter by
expanding the definition of “AOO”. This is part of the act’s attempt to
“bridge the gap” between GIs and AOOs.31 Under the new definition, an
AOO, just like a GI, does not necessarily need to incorporate a toponym,
but could be a “denomination known as referring to [the relevant] area.”32
28. Gervais, supra note 11, at 349.
29. Id. at 352–54.
30. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of The International Intellectual Property System, 77
CHI-KENT L. REV. 993, at 996-99 (2002).
31. See, generally, Gervais, supra note 11, at 340; Int'l Trademark Ass'n, supra note 25; Dudding,
supra note 4, at 178.
32. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., supra note 27 (Geneva Act), see art. 1(vi) read together with art.
2(1)(i) (emphasis added).
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The only significant difference between AOOs and GIs under the Geneva
Act thus appears to be:
(a) a good designated by an AOO must have a quality or
characteristics resulting from the geographical environment,
including natural and human factors, in which that good
originates, and which has given the good its reputation; whereas,
(b) a good designated by a GI must have a quality, reputation or
other characteristic resulting from its geographical origin. 33
This conflation of the definitions for two already confusingly
overlapping concepts is retrograde. Not only does it introduce semantic
confusion, but also it further “untethers” indicia originis from the land. As
I argue in Part V, this is contrary to the theoretical justifications for this
subject matter. Thus, while introducing the language of GIs may have the
benefit of including terminology with which the New World postcolonial
countries are familiar, this is very much an improvement of form and not
one of substance. I therefore disagree with Gervais that this “dual
approach” is an improvement;34 rather, it is markedly disadvantageous.
It follows from the analysis above that the Geneva Act has sought to
bring within the Lisbon system’s orbit trademark-based IO protection,
apparently to encourage common law jurisdictions to join. However, in so
doing, the Geneva Act has had the effect of broadening and strengthening
the level of protection given to both AOOs and trademark-based GIs under
the Lisbon system. This is because, although an AOO enjoyed more
expansive rights under the Lisbon Agreement than a GI traditionally
receives in trademark-based systems, as explained in Part I.C above, a GI is
a broader concept than an AOO (e.g., while a GI may include a toponym,
that was a necessary element of an AOO under the Lisbon Agreement).
Thus, if the aim was to attract “New World” countries already chary of
strengthening protection for indicia originis, strengthening the protection
that indicia originis receive under the Lisbon system would appear to be an
odd way of going about achieving that aim.
II.C: TRIPS and the WTO
The debate between the Old World European countries seeking strong
indication of origin protection and New World postcolonial countries
seeking to temper the strength of such protection is manifest in TRIPs.

33. Id. see arts. 1(vi), 1(vii), read together with art. 2(1). See the full text of arts. 2(1)(i) and
2(1)(ii) at supra note 27.
34. Gervais, supra note 11, at 347–48.
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Early in the Uruguay Round TRIPS negotiations, the EU sought
strong protection for indications of origin, including that all GIs be
protected against any usurpation, imitation or evocation, even where
accompanied by expressions such as “kind”, “type”, “style”, “imitation” or
the like, and requiring refusal or invalidation of any application or
registration for a trademark containing “a geographical or other indication
denominating or suggesting a country, region or locality with respect to
goods not having this origin.”35
By contrast, the US draft text granted very sparse protection to GIs
and under a trademark-based, rather than more stringent sui generis,
system. It simply obliged parties to protect GIs that certify regional origin
by providing for their registration as certification or collective marks, and
also to protect non-generic appellations for wine. 36
As is often the case with major negotiations, things that fall into the
“too hard” basket are left to be dealt with at a later time. The Uruguay
Round negotiations resulted in WTO members being required to protect
indications of origin, but having discretion as to the system of protection
and only having to protect a subset of such indications, denoting wines and
spirits, against imitation even where the true origin is indicated or where
accompanied by expressions such as “kind”, “type”, “style”, “imitation” or
the like.37 Article 24 of TRIPS obliges members to enter into negotiations
aimed at increasing the level of protection of GIs under art. 23 (Additional
Protection for Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits).
Since the signing of TRIPS, a deeply divided debate has taken place
within the TRIPS Council between IO advocates seeking to extend the
higher level of protection afforded IOs for wines and spirits and those who
oppose the extension. Proponents include the EU, Guinea, India, Jamaica,
Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Pakistan, Romania, Sri Lanka,
Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia and Turkey, who wish to use the higher
level of protection to improve marketing of their products. Opponents
include Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, New Zealand,
Panama, Paraguay, the Philippines, Chinese Taipei and the US, who stress
35. European Communities, Draft Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights,
at
arts.
19
to
21
(March
29,
1990),
http://www.tripsagreement.net/documents/GATTdocs/Draft_Agreement_on_Trade_Related_Aspects_o
f_IP_Rights_E_E.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
36. United States, Draft Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
at
arts.
18
and
19
(May 11,
1990),
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/mtn.gng_.ng11.w.70_11may1990_us_draft_trips.pdf (last visited
Dec. 3, 2016).
37. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 3 (TRIPS), at arts. 22 and 23.
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the view that migrants should not be penalized for having taken names and
methods of making products from their homeland and using them in good
faith.38
The inability of IO advocates to seek increased protection for all IOs
through the TRIPS Council process may at least in part explain the efforts
to secure higher protection for IOs through the Geneva Act (described in
Part II.B above). This process of securing protection outside of the broad
multilateral framework of the WTO is evidence of fragmentation in the
field of IOs. Gervais suggests that, notwithstanding the deep philosophical
divide between IO advocates and opponents, the practical effect of
exogenous pressures (namely, the benefit of access to European markets
that New World countries may gain in return for concessions on IO
protection) may lead to acceptance of the higher level of protection for IOs
of the kind provided in the Geneva Act.39 One way of testing this view, as
well as my argument of increased fragmentation, is by considering how the
recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) deals with IOs.
II.D: TPP
The TPP (signed on February 4, 2016) is a multilateral trade
agreement between 12 Pacific Rim countries that has the overall effect of
requiring signatories to increase intellectual property protection. Five of its
signatories are against higher IO protection (Australia, Canada, Chile, New
Zealand, and the US) and two are members of the Lisbon Agreement
(Mexico, Peru).
The TPP defines a GI in substantively the same terms as TRIPS. 40 Key
relevant features of the TPP are:
(a) it allows parties to protect GIs through trademark, sui generis or
other legal means (art. 18.30);
(b) it requires any administrative procedures to be transparent and
without imposition of overly burdensome formalities (art. 18.31);
(c) it requires parties to allow interested persons to oppose/cancel the
GI on the grounds that, in the territory of the party (not of the
origin of the GI good) the GI is:

38. WORLD TRADE ORG., TRIPS: Geographical Indications - Background and the current
situation (2016), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/gi_background_e.htm#protection (last
visited Dec. 3, 2016); see also Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon-the Spirited Debate
About Geographical Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299, at 320–31 (2006); and Gervais, supra note 11.
39. Gervais, supra note 11, at 340, 346, 368-71.
40. TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (signed on February 4, 2016), at art. 18.1
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Intellectual-Property.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
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(i)

likely to cause confusion with a trademark that is the subject
of a pre-existing good faith pending application or
registration;
(ii) likely to cause confusion with a pre-existing trademark; or
(iii) a term customary in common language as the common
name for the relevant good (art. 18.32.1);
(d) if a party protects or recognizes a GI pursuant to another
international agreement, it must, among other things, provide that
the above grounds of opposition/cancellation be available in
respect of that GI (art. 18.36.1), unless the GI was specifically
identified in, and recognized/protected pursuant to, an
international agreement concluded before the TPP (art. 18.36.6);
and
(e) the above requirements in general do not apply to GIs for wine
and spirits (see, e.g., art. 18.32, fn. 21; art. 18.36.4, but see also
art. 18.32.1(c), fn. 21, being a carve-out for customary names of
a grape variety existing in the territory of a party). 41
It is apparent from the above analysis that, while the EU and other IO
proponents have sought elevated protection for indications of origin via the
Geneva Act, the US and other IO opponents have sought to reinforce the
principles of a trademark-based system under the TPP. This system is
founded on the doctrines of capacity to distinguish (and avoid consumer
confusion), first-in-time priority to a trademark and genericide. While
negotiations within the broad multilateral framework of the TRIPS Council
have stalled, pro- and anti-IO forces have pursued their interests in other
plurilateral and regional fora, leading to a marked fragmentation in
international IO law. This would tend to undermine Gervais’s postulation
that “trade bricks” could form the stuff of a bridge between the pro- and
anti-IO camps. 42 The overview of the “economic geography” of IOs in
Part III provides further evidence of fragmentation.
PART III: THE ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF IOS – FURTHER
FRAGMENTATION
III.A: Political economy of IOs
As Kal Raustiala and Stephen Munzer have persuasively argued, the
increasingly persistent efforts to cement indicia originis in international
41. Id.
42. Gervais, supra note 11, at 340, 346, 368-71.
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law may be attributed to: (i) falling trade barriers that have lowered the
prices of IO protected goods and engendered a global market for previously
local, discrete markets; (ii) goods similar to IO protected goods existing in
many states due to prior waves of immigration, which brought skills and
tastes to new locations, and these goods now competing with their
“original” forebears on global markets; and (iii) rising wealth and falling
food prices increasing the share of household income available for niche
food products, often marketed under IOs. 43 IOs therefore exemplify the
process of “glocalization”, or “the simultaneity—the co-presence—of both
universalizing and particularizing tendencies.”44 For IOs, protection of the
local product is important to expanding global markets for that product.45
In other words, global markets value IO products because of their local
characteristics, quality or reputation owing to their geographical
provenance, i.e., their authenticity.
III.B: Potential economic value of IOs
To put it crudely, IOs can now mean big bucks for rural regions in
Europe (and other locations whose names have become so bound up with
goods made there that inhabitants can trade off the name). By way of
illustration, in France, the average price of IO protected cheeses (€10.42
per kg) is 30 percent higher than that of non-IO cheeses (€8.11 per kg).46
Further, in France, over the period of 1997-2001, total revenue from IO
products increased by 6.8 percent per annum, compared with corresponding
per annum growth rates of 0.7 percent, 3.7 percent and 4.2 percent for the
farming sector, food industry overall, and Gross National Product,
respectively (see Figure 1).47

43. Raustiala and Munzer, supra note 2, at 347.
44. Roland Robertson, Comments on the “Global Triad” and “Glocalization” (1997),
http://www2.kokugakuin.ac.jp/ijcc/wp/global/15robertson.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
45. Giovannucci et al., supra note 12, at xvii.
46. Id. at 29.
47. Id. at 30. Figure 1 is a reproduction of Figure 2.4 in Giovannucci et al., supra note 12 at 30. It
has been reproduced with permission from the International Trade Centre, Geneva, Switzerland. The
full content of Giovannucci et al., supra note 12 is available at www.intracen.org/publications.
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FIGURE 1: Selected economic growth rates, France, 1997-2001
The monetary value of IOs is not limited to France. In Vietnam,
following the provision of IO protection for Phu Quoc Fish Sauce (Phu
Quoc is an island in southwest Vietnam), its domestic price reportedly rose
from approximately €0.50 to €1.50 per liter.48 In China, my own research
indicates that the average price for West Lake Longjing (a green tea from
West Lake district, Zhejiang that has enjoyed IO protection since 2001)49 at
three randomly selected teashops in Beijing is 1,867RMB per 500g
compared with 433RMB per 500g for Longjing from outside West Lake
district.50 It bears mentioning that all three above jurisdictions protect IOs
under a sui generis system (with China using both sui generis and
trademark systems). It would be interesting to compare whether or not
there is a significant difference between the values of IOs protected under
trademark-based systems as compared with sui generis systems, but that is
beyond the scope of this article.
III.C: Approaches to protecting IOs
As was shown in Part II, the social, cultural and economic pressures
exerted by “glocalization” have not resulted in a harmonious approach to
international IO agreements. Indeed, fragmentation in IO protection stems
in no small part from inter-country systemic differences.

48. Id. at 28-29.
49. Id. at 29.
50. Benjamin Hopper, Fieldwork Notes for Masters Thesis at Harvard Law School, on file with
author.
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Countries can be divided into those, generally Old World/civil law,
jurisdictions with a sui generis system under which unique and specific
protection is provided for IOs (i.e., they are not “subsumed” within a preexisting intellectual property regime) and those, generally New
World/common law, jurisdictions that protect IOs under the pre-existing
trademark regime, generally as certification trademarks 51 or collective
trademarks.52 Sui generis system countries tend to rely quite heavily on the
concept of terroir: the idea that “a particular land is a key input for a
particular product.”53 By way of illustration, the European Commission
drew on the concept of terroir in a 2005 IO food media campaign,
describing “le goût du terroir” (i.e., “the taste of the terroir”) as “a distinct,
identifiable taste reminiscent of a place, region or locality . . . Foods and
beverages that evoke the term terroir have signature qualities that link
their taste to a specific soil with particular climate conditions. Only the
land, climate and expertise of the local people can produce the product that
lives up to its name.”54
The key distinctions between a sui generis IO approach and a
trademark approach are summarized in Table 1 below.55
Feature

Trademark approach

Alienability

Anyone. Typically individual
entity or corporation,
sometimes collective or
government
Yes

Rights to name

First in time

Protection

Private. Burden primarily on
owner to enforce
Necessary to maintenance

Ownership

Use

Sui generis approach
Producers or government

Linked to origin. Cannot be
delocalized
Distinguishes legitimate
rights to origin, irrespective of
time of application
Public. Burden primarily on
government to enforce
Collective, open to all
producers who comply with
rules

51. A certification mark is a mark registered by an entity that does not use the mark, but is
authorized to certify that goods or services used in connection with the mark meet a certain standard,
including having a particular place of origin, material and/or method of manufacture.
52. A collective mark is a mark used by members of an association to distinguish their goods or
services from the goods or services of persons who are not members of the association.
53. Hughes, supra note 35, at 301.
54. Cited in Raustiala and Munzer, supra note 2, at 344.
55. Adapted from Giovannucci et al., supra note 12, at 55.
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Feature

Trademark approach

Quality

Not specified, except for
some certification marks

Name or sign

May be created and may or
may not include geographic
name

227

Sui generis approach
Disclosed in standards or
specifications obligatorily
linked to origin
Must exist already and must
link to terroir

TABLE 1: Trademark and sui generis approaches to IOs
Common law jurisdictions tend to prefer the trademark, private rights
based approach to protecting IOs, while civil law jurisdictions tend to
prefer the sui generis approach, under which IOs are inalienable
community assets that cannot be decoupled from their origin. 56 This is
illustrated by the map in Figure 2. The map shows that countries with a
trademark approach to IOs tend to be common law jurisdictions and former
colonies of the United Kingdom. One hundred and eleven countries use a
sui generis system, while 56 countries use a trademark system. 57

FIGURE 2: IO protection for agri-food products58
56. Id. at 55.
57. Id. at 124.
58. Id. at 50. Figure 2 is a reproduction of Figure 4.1 in Giovannucci et al., supra note 12, at 50. It
has been reproduced with permission from the International Trade Centre, Geneva, Switzerland. The
full content of Giovannucci et al., supra note 12 is available at www.intracen.org/publications.
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Within these countries, there is a variety of mechanisms by which IO
protection is provided, adding to the global fragmentation of the concept of
IOs. These differences feed into differences of approach within the
international IO order. While many countries agree there would be benefits
to having a common international registration system, they differ on how
such a system should be structured.59
III.D: The nation-state and IOs
The fragmentation described above does not only flow from
philosophical, systemic and economic factors. Borrowing from Arjun
Appadurai’s postcolonial analysis of disjuncture and difference in the
global cultural economy,60 the heated debate over IOs may be understood
as stemming from the widening “hyphen” between nation and state in
“nation-state”—61a hyphen being stretched ever further with the movement
of peoples (i.e., nations) away from states in increasingly disparate
directions. By way of illustration, the fame of “feta” spread with the largescale emigration of Greeks. These emigrants made “feta” from cow’s milk
due to low supplies of traditional “feta” (made with sheep’s and goat’s
milk). They continued to use the word “feta” due to its existing
reputation.62 Thus, the New World approach to IOs may be understood as
part of an “ethnoscape” (the global, not necessarily contiguous, spaces
inhabited by communities of persons who may share “imagined worlds”) 63
of people who have migrated away from the IO territory but retained its
culture, including names for particular goods from that territory. This
represents the “nation” fighting against the “state”, manifest in the Old
World approach to IOs, whose states seek to maintain control over cultural
products originating in their territories. The value of IOs to the consumer
may be understood as a form of “production fetishism” —the fetish for
authentic locally produced goods (often an illusion in a global economy
marked by transnational production loci). 64 Thus, the disjuncture between
nation and state is central to the global cultural flows of IOs.

59. Id. at 41.
60. Arjun Appadurai, Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy, 2 PUBLIC
CULT., Vol. 2, No. 2, 11(1990).
61. Id. at 13-14.
62. O’Connor and Kireeva, supra note 10, at 117.
63. Id. at 7.
64. Id. at 16.
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When understood in this light, the protracted and, thus far, fruitless
negotiations concerning IOs at the TRIPS Council and the divergent
approaches being taken by the likes of the EU and the US in various trade
agreements, begin to make sense. Can a normative justification for a
specific form of IO be found that might bridge the gap between migrantreceiving states (that favor a trademark approach) and migrant-sending
states (that favor a sui generis approach)? I now turn to this fundamental
and, I contend, hitherto unresolved question.
PART IV: DOCTRINAL AND CONCEPTUAL TENSIONS
IV.A: Doctrinal and conceptual tensions
It may be regarded as remarkable that IOs have sought to be protected
as trademarks given what appear to be irreconcilable tensions between the
conceptual and theoretical underpinnings for IOs and trademarks. In this
part, I argue that, upon proper scrutiny, IOs and their closest cousin in the
intellectual property family, trademarks, clash irreconcilably. In particular,
the cognate key tenets of trademark doctrine of capacity to distinguish and
“genericide” cannot be reconciled with IO’s protection for place names and
refusal to accept the consequences of “genericide”.
IV.B: Doctrinal and conceptual tension between IOs and trademarks
It is a fundamental tenet of trademark law that, to be registrable, a
trademark must be distinctive. This means that, on the grounds of public
policy, one trader “ought not to be allowed to obtain by registration under
the Trade Marks Act a monopoly in what other traders may legitimately
desire to use.”65 Words forming part of the common language should be
free to all to use in the course of their business and no one person should be
able to claim exclusive rights to dictionary words. Thus, the question of
distinctiveness largely depends on “whether other traders are likely, in the
ordinary course of their business and without any improper motive, to
desire to use the same mark, or some mark nearly resembling it, upon or in
connection with their own goods.”66
It follows that “no person should be able to monopolise a place name,
because the effect of registration would be to impose an unreasonable
restraint upon other traders who may legitimately wish to use that name in
65. Smith, Kline and French Laboratories Ltd v Sterling-Winthrop Group Ltd, [1976] RPC 511, at
538–39.
66. W & G Du Cros Ltd’s Application, (1913) 30 RPC 660, at 672.
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relation to their own goods or services.”67 The only exception to this is
where the use of a place name does not carry the signification of the place.
This may arise in two circumstances: (i) the place name used in respect of
the specified goods or services does not connote the place because it is an
arbitrary/fanciful usage (e.g., AMAZON (a vast rainforest in South
America) for an online store); 68 and (ii) the place name has acquired
distinctiveness or secondary meaning, such that its use in respect of
specified goods or services no longer denotes a geographical location, but
rather, it denotes a particular trader and/or a particular quality or “brand”
associated with a good or service (e.g., the word COLUMBIA (the name
of, among other things, the largest river in the Pacific Northwest region of
North America)69 used in respect of sportswear has come to be associated,
at least in the US, with the sportswear company originally named for the
river near where the company was founded).70
The underlying reasoning has been explained as follows: “if goods of
the kind in question are produced at the particular place or in the area, or
if it is reasonable to suppose that such goods in the future will be produced
there, other traders have a legitimate interest in using the geographical
name to identify their goods, and it is this interest which is not to be
supplanted by permitting any one trader to effect trade mark
registration.”71
In stark contrast, the very purpose of an IO (be it a GI or an AOO) is
to signify that the good in respect of which it is used comes from the
indicated place. Thus, if an indicium originis functions as intended to
signify a place where goods of the kind in question are produced, then it
should absolutely not be registered as a trademark. The counter-position
from a pro-IO enthusiast might be that, if a person wishes to produce goods
of the kind in question at the place, then, provided certain stipulated criteria
are complied with, that person may use the place name for their product.
The rebuttal from the trademark perspective is threefold. First, the
requirement that certain stipulated criteria be complied with infringes upon
freedom of trade (i.e., freedom to manufacture as one wishes). Secondly, if
the place name can be used in a manner that is distinctive (e.g., AMAZON
67. Re Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Oxford T/A Oxford University Press
v the Registrar of Trade Marks, (1990) 24 FCR 1, at 24.
68. J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition (Fourth Edition,
2016), at § 14:7.
69. WIKIPEDIA, Columbia River, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbia_River (last visited
Dec. 3, 2016).
70. WIKIPEDIA, Columbia Sportswear, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbia_Sportswear (last
visited Dec. 3, 2016).
71. Re Chancellor, supra note 67, at 41.
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for an online store (inherent distinctiveness) or COLUMBIA for sportswear
(acquired distinctiveness)), then it is unreasonable to restrain traders from
using that name in good faith in that fashion. Thirdly, as explained further
in Part IV.C below, if the place name has entered the common language as
the name for the good, irrespective of where it is produced, no one person
or association should have the monopoly over that term. The doctrinal
tension between IOs and trademarks is irreconcilable.
IV.C: Tension between GIs and AOOs
As signalled above, a tension persists between a “pure” form of IOs,
represented by the sui generis approach of AOOs, and a trademark form of
IOs, represented by GIs. A GI is subject to a form of GI genericide (“geogenericide”) well captured by art. 18.32 of the TPP (discussed in Part II.D
above), namely, becoming “a term customary in common language as the
common name for the relevant good.” However, even if an AOO enters the
vernacular as the common reference for the referent good, on a pure IO
approach, the exclusive right to that AOO should remain with the
producers in the AOO region.
For example, the word “feta” is commonly used to refer to salty,
crumbly white cheese made from sheep’s and/or goat’s milk. 72 Some might
argue that, although it has retained a cultural affiliation with Greece, the
word has become so commonly used that it no longer signifies such cheese
originating in Greece, but cheese with the qualities just described
irrespective of the locus of production. An AOO purist would nonetheless
insist that that cultural affiliation with place be retained, even if it becomes
very distant. A trademark lawyer, however, would say the word has entered
the common language and to grant monopoly rights to its use is
anathema.73
Similarly, imagine that the word “Champagne” were to begin to
signify something other than sparkling wine in the mind of the ordinary
consumer. For example, through widespread colloquial usage it came to
mean, “to gather for a soirée.” On a pure AOO approach, the consumer
should be educated that the subsequent “slang” is inferior and subservient

72. See O’Connor and Kireeva, supra note 10, at 116-17.
73. Note: in 2005, the European Court of Justice confirmed the validity of the IO (specifically, the
Protected Designation of Origin) for “feta”. See Federal Republic of Germany and Kingdom of
Denmark v. Commission of the European Communities, E.C.R. (2005); WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
DEFINING
A
NAME’S
ORIGIN:
THE
CASE
OF
FETA,
http://www.wipo.int/ipadvantage/en/details.jsp?id=5578 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
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to the original place name designation for sparkling wine. On a trademark
approach, this slang meaning should not be policed in any way.
These distinct approaches to geo-genericide compound the doctrinal
and conceptual irreconcilability between IOs and trademarks. The source of
the tension, however, is not only to be found in doctrinal differences, but
also in the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of each. These are
examined in the next part of this article.
PART V: ELICITING THE THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR IOS
While the closest cousin of IOs are trademarks, the normative
justifications of the two forms of mark are distinct and do not admit of
merger. In this part, after identifying the functions of trademarks and IOs, I
argue that the theoretical justifications for IOs do not lie solely in
traditional theories of intellectual property (welfare, labor, personhood, and
cultural theory), but also, and more significantly, are grounded in the
protection, maintenance and sharing of cultural heritage.
V.A: The functions and justifications of trademarks
In a highly illuminating article, Lee Burgunder identifies three key
functions of trademarks:
(a) to enable consumers to discriminate efficiently among similar
products in the marketplace with minimal private and social costs
(Distinguishing Function);
(b) to preserve the goodwill of traders (and, hence, foster incentives
for traders to offer quality goods and services) (Goodwill
Function); and
(c) to allow consumers to associate goods or services in the
marketplace with certain forms of information expressed in
advertising (Advertising Function).74
Burgunder stresses that these are “the only legitimate functions of
trademarks.”75 But perhaps his point may be better put as follows: if a mark
is not serving one of these functions, or another socially valuable function,
then exclusive use of the mark should neither be recognized nor enforced.
To the above functions of trademarks, I would add:
(d) to encourage the development of signs that enrich culture through
free participation in semiotic democracy, i.e., in “the process of
74. Lee B. Burgunder, An Economic Approach to Trademark Genericism, 23 AM. BUS. L.J. 391,
at 396 (1985).
75. Id..
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making cultural meaning”76 or “the construction of [one’s]
cultural environment” (Cultural Function);77
(e) to promote social harmony through a system of registration that
enables all persons in a society to know which trademarks belong
to whom and which may be safely used without infringing on
another’s rights (which would disturb the Goodwill Function) or
causing consumer confusion (which would disturb the
Distinguishing Function) (Social Harmony Function).
A trademark will not serve a socially valuable function if that
trademark per se constitutes a barrier to effective competition, in which
case it should be cancelled.78 This happens where a trademark becomes a
common descriptive name (e.g., a dictionary or “Urban Dictionary” 79 term
for something) and ceases to signify the trader or the trader’s “brand”. If
this happens, maintenance of the registration for that trademark
substantially reduces substitutability, not because of the association with a
particular person (who has invested in goodwill and should therefore retain
the benefit of that goodwill in the form of a trademark registration), but
because it has become a common word that other traders may well desire to
use in the course of trade without any improper motive. This may be
because the mark has become the most convenient and efficient means of
communicating information about those traders’ goods or services (e.g., it
is much more convenient and efficient to say “feta” than to say “white,
salty, crumbly cheese made from sheep and/or goat’s milk”). In short, if the
trademark becomes a common descriptive term, it is not able to fulfill the
above functions and loses its raison d’etre
Traditional theories of intellectual property help to explicate a
trademark system’s functions. These are: welfare theory (or utilitarianism),
labor (or just desserts) theory, personhood (or personality) theory and
cultural (or social planning) theory. Each theory is briefly explained in turn
before applying them to the functions of trademarks identified above.

76. William W. Fisher III, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, at 193 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001),
http://elplandehiram.org/documentos/cursos/ftpi/FisherIPTheories.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
77. WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF
ENTERTAINMENT, at 241 (2004).
78. Burgunder, supra note 74, at 396.
79. Courts are increasingly relying on Urban Dictionary in decision-making. See, e.g., Leslie
Kaufman, For the Word on the Street, Courts Call Up an Online Witness, THE NEW YORK TIMES, May
20, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/business/media/urban-dictionary-finds-a-place-in-thecourtroom.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
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Welfare theory (the principal theory applied to intellectual property)80
notes that intellectual property comprises “public goods”, which include
signs like IOs. These public goods share the attributes of being (i) nonrivalrous (use of the good by one person does not prevent use of the good
by other persons) and (ii) non-excludable (once the good has been made
available to one person, it is difficult, if not impossible, to prevent others
from gaining access to it). These attributes mean that, without some kind of
government intervention to allow recoupment of the high costs of original
production, such goods may not be produced in the first place. Welfare
theory suggests that one means of dealing with this public goods problem is
by granting government-backed exclusive rights (e.g., intellectual property
rights) to those goods. This exclusivity is justified if, and to the extent that,
its benefits to society outweigh its costs (i.e., Bentham’s “greatest good for
the greatest number”).81
Labor theory postulates that a person should acquire property rights in
a thing resulting from mixing their labor with un-owned things or things
held in common.82 This is subject to the proviso that, after acquiring the
property rights, “there is enough and as good left in common for others.”83
Under labor theory then, a person has a natural right to their artistic or
scientific creations, subject to that right not breaching the proviso.84
Personhood theory, derived from Kantian and Hegelian thought,85
postulates that creators of things are entitled to considerable continuing
control over their creations, where injuries to those creations injures the
creator’s self, or control over those creations is part of a general project of
creating and maintaining an identity. 86
Cultural theory postulates that intellectual property rights should be
shaped so as to foster a just and attractive culture. 87 As William Fisher
explains, “[t]his approach is similar to utilitarianism in its teleological
orientation, but dissimilar in its willingness to deploy visions of a desirable

80. Peter S. Menell, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: GENERAL THEORIES 129, at 130 (Boudewijn
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume I. The History and
Methodology of Law and Economics) (2000).
81. Fisher, supra note 76, at 169-70; 177–84; Menell, supra note 80, at 130–31.
82. Robert Nozick, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA, at 174-182 (1999).
83. John Locke, TWO TREATISES, at section 27 (P Laslett ed., 1970).
84. Fisher, supra note 76, at 170-71.
85. Id. at 171; Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L. J. 287 (1988).
86. See Fisher, supra note 76; and Hughes, supra note 85.
87. For more comprehensive discussions of these theories, see the seminal Fisher, supra note 76;
and (on labor and personhood theories) see Hughes, supra note 85.
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society richer than the conceptions of ‘social welfare’ deployed by
utilitarians.”88
Applying these theories to the functions of trademarks identified
above then, one can say:
(a) welfare theory supports the trademark’s Distinguishing Function,
as any losses associated with the exclusive rights to a particular,
distinctive mark are outweighed by the benefit to society as a
whole in reducing search costs and minimizing confusion;
(b) labor theory seems most adapted to supporting the trademark’s
Goodwill Function – traders’ investment in building the name of
their goods or services ought to be rewarded with exclusive
rights in order to incentivize ongoing consistent rendering of
those goods or services. Personhood theory is also relevant,
particularly where personal reputation is bound up in the
goodwill attaching to a trademark;
(c) welfare theory supports the trademark’s Advertising Function
because of that function’s contribution to minimizing search
costs;
(d) labor and cultural theory support the trademark’s Cultural
Function because adding to the “cultural stock” (with new signs)
ought to be rewarded and it also tends to foster a just and
attractive culture; and
(e) welfare and cultural theory support the trademark’s Social
Harmony Function because the order of formalities is necessary
to the Distinguishing Function and is also necessary to avoid the
semiotic confusion that would result in the absence of
formalities, upsetting the Cultural Function.
V.B: The functions and justifications of IOs
The functions of IOs are similar to, but in significant respects distinct
from, those of trademarks. More importantly for present purposes, the
normative justifications for them do not reside solely in traditional theories
of intellectual property.
(a) IOs serve a Distinguishing Function, but do not distinguish a
particular trader or “brand”; rather, they distinguish a particular
product made in a particular place. The normative justification
for this is not a welfare theory-based benefit of minimizing
search costs; rather, it may be justified on the basis of recognition
88. Fisher, supra note 76, at 172.
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of cultural heritage. Personhood theory lends support to this
function, but only to the extent that the group’s personality is
bound up in the land delimited by the IO and not to the extent
that the personality is bound up in transportable knowledge used
to make IO goods;89
(b) IOs serve a Goodwill Function, but seek to preserve the goodwill
of the community of IO good producers and not that of individual
traders. As with trademarks, the normative justification for this
lies in labor theory. What is rewarded is not the ancestors’ labor
involved in originally creating the terroir-based product, 90 but
rather the current inhabitants’ maintenance of the tradition of
making that product in a particular place, as well as their
foregoing other potentially more lucrative opportunities that
could be made of that place such as the development of large
hotel, entertainment and/or residential complexes or the building
of factories or offices;91
(c) IOs serve an Advertising Function in the sense of acting as a
mnemonic for information about the IO goods, but that
information pertains to the good’s connection to a particular
place (i.e., information that the IO good has a particular quality
owing to its terrestrial provenance);
(d) IOs serve a Cultural Function of a sort—not in the sense of
adding new cultural stock; but rather in the sense of preserving
cultural heritage linked to a particular place; and
(e) IOs serve a Social Harmony Function. However, this is not
justified on the basis of a first-to-use or first-to-file priority
principle like trademarks; rather, it is justified on the basis that
giving inhabitants of a place the exclusive right to use a place
name (or place-evoking name) for a locally produced good is the
best means of securing social harmony.
The principal normative justifications for IOs then are to be found not
solely in traditional theories of property,92 but rather in a combination of:
(i) a cultural heritage theory, under which the preservation of cultural
heritage is valued; (ii) labor theory, under which the sacrifice made to use
the land in the interests of preserving cultural heritage is valued and (iii)
89. Cf. Raustiala and Munzer, supra note 2, at 358–59.
90. Contra Raustiala and Munzer, Id. at 354-357.
91. Cf. Justin Hughes, Traditional Knowledge, Cultural Expression, and the Siren’s Call of
Property, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, at 29 (2013).
92. Contra Raustiala and Munzer, supra note 2.
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personhood theory, under which a group’s connection to their land is
valued. On this view, irrespective of whether or not an IO becomes a
common descriptive term or could be used in an arbitrary or fancy fashion
that would not cause consumer confusion, it should be reserved for the
current occupants of the particular place whose name forms the IO,
provided it retains an intimate connection to its indicated land. Otherwise,
the IO could not function as the elicited cultural heritage and labor theory
justifications require. Further, the personhood theory justification for IOs
provides a basis for an anti-dilution right in respect of IOs, i.e., a right to
prevent use of IOs even in translated form or accompanied by terms such as
“kind,” “type,” “make,” “imitation”, or the like. 93 This is because such use
by others may tend to do injury to the community’s and its members’ sense
of connection to their land.
The key point is that, the stronger the tie between the IO and the land,
the more the grant of an exclusive IO right can be justified on the above
grounds without doing harm to others’ trademarks and common language
use rights. Conversely, the more untethered from the land the IO becomes
(i.e., the weaker its capacity to evoke a particular geographical location),
the less it is justified on the above grounds. It loses its raison d’être and is
therefore less deserving of exclusive rights. In other words, to the extent
that the IO is used in respect of knowledge that happens to come from a
particular place, it should not be protected; it should only be protected to
the extent it is used in respect of its connection with the land. This is
consistent with Raustalia and Munzer’s finding that “the more human
factors—which are moveable—matter, the weaker is the rationale for
protecting a GI only in a specified region.”94
If an IO is closely connected to a particular delimited geographic
region, the argument that persons from outside that region should be
prevented from using an IO signifying a product from that region’s soil
gains significant force. This is because it is not possible for others to
produce the same product, even using the same transportable know-how,
on different soil. After all, this link to the soil lies at the core of IOs’ raison
d’être.
The desideratum of an intimate relationship with the land being a sine
qua non of IO protection is reinforced by the following key difference
between IOs and all other intellectual property rights. Whereas the
“commons” for IOs (i.e., places) is limited—there are only so many places
93. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., supra note 20 (Lisbon Agreement), at art.3.
94. Raustiala and Munzer, supra note 2, at 353. Note: in this quote, “GI” may be understood as
equivalent in meaning to “IO” as used in this article.
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in the world (or in the galaxy should production of a good move to a
“terroir” in outer space); the commons for ideas that could form the basis
for other forms of intellectual property, including trademarks, is virtually
unlimited. A “loose” regime for IO protection could well result in an overproliferation of place names being unjustifiably reserved for exclusive use.
PART VI: CONCLUSION – AOOS FOR ALL
The reason IO proponents’ efforts to secure a global IO system have
faltered is that they have demonstrably failed to link IOs to a consistent
theoretical framework and have sought to expand IOs beyond the confines
of what their theoretical justification allows. This expansion has led to IO
laws, including the Geneva Act, that seek to cover subject matter not
justified by IOs’ normative foundation. Consequently, these laws lack
“internal morality” (in the sense used by Lon Fuller).95 By the same token,
the US’s (and others’) efforts to “accommodate” IOs within a trademark
framework is a far from ideal approach, given the irreconcilable tensions
between IOs and trademarks identified in Part IV above.
In an era marked by glocalization and disjuncture, from the above
analysis it follows that a unitary, harmonious and multilateral AOO regime
should be agreed to under which protection of the kind guaranteed in the
Geneva Act (see Part II.B above) is given to the subject matter of AOOs,
very strictly and narrowly defined by reference to their relationship to the
land. The distinction between AOOs and GIs ought to be kept clear, with
GIs simply being a term for a sign consisting of or containing a toponym
(or other place reference) subject to the exact same regime as any other
trademark, including the doctrines of distinctiveness and genericide. Under
this approach, it would be impermissible, without the authority of the
AOO-owner, to use or register under the trademark system a GI containing
a registered AOO, unless the use of the AOO is incidental and would not
connote any relationship with the goods protected by the AOO. This
approach would serve to ensure that AOO and GI laws remain true to their
normative justifications, as well as providing semantic and conceptual
clarity (features sorely missing from the IO debate until now).
Having concluded that an AOO should receive the strong protection
afforded under the Geneva Act, but be narrowly defined, I propose the
following definition. An AOO must:

95. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV.
630 (1958).
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(a) consist of or contain a place name, or be a name strongly
connected with the referent place in the mind of the ordinary
consumer in the jurisdiction wherein the place is located [in the
lattermost case, the applicant would bear the burden of proving
the strong connection, for example, by clear and convincing
evidence that it evokes the place in the mind of the ordinary
consumer]; and
(b) designate goods that either (i) per se originate from a particular
place, or (ii) are made from raw materials originating in a
particular place and any processing of those raw materials occurs
in that place using local knowledge.
My definition of an AOO is consistent with the Lisbon Agreement’s
definition: “the geographical denomination of a country, region, or
locality, which serves to designate a product originating therein, the
quality or characteristics of which are due exclusively or essentially to the
geographical environment, including natural and human factors.” I do
allow non-toponymic AOOs, but only where there is the requisite strong
connection between the AOO and the referent place. Further, I add the
requirement that the product consist of, or be made from, raw materials
originating from the earth of the geographical environment encompassed
by the geographical denomination and, if made from raw materials, be
made using local knowledge. The “local materials” and “local knowledge”
elements are necessary to ensure that only AOOs with an intimate
connection to the indicated land are afforded protection.
The justifications for this approach are grounded primarily in
traditional trademark theory, labor theory, personhood theory and cultural
heritage theory (and cultural theory more generally). If the stringent
definition for AOOs set out above is applied, then it will be true that others,
even transporting/planting the same raw materials to the “second-comer”
region, will not be able to reproduce goods with quite the same quality or
characteristics as the goods produced in the AOO-protected region, with
the result that (i) using the same name for goods from a different place
could genuinely lead to consumer confusion and/or harm to the IO name
(e.g., a consumer tastes a different-tasting good from the second-comer
region and is deceived into thinking the taste of goods from the AOO
region has changed), and (ii) using the same name would undermine the
efforts and sacrifices that those in the AOO-protected region have made.
These efforts should be rewarded, not only because of the efforts made by
the AOO-region’s producers (and opportunities forgone, e.g., to develop
resort complexes or mining operations), but also because they lead to the
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maintenance of cultural heritage from which we all can derive value and
pleasure.
While the above proposal, owing to its narrow definition of protected
subject matter (AOOs) provides less protection than under the Geneva Act
(which may be understood as the type of protection the EU and its AOOallies would like to see promulgated worldwide) and uses a sui generis,
rather than trademark, system of the kind privileged in the TPP (which may
be understood as the type of protection the US and its GI-allies are willing
to see promulgated worldwide), I consider that it strikes a measured, as
well as doctrinally, conceptually and theoretically justified balance between
pro- and anti-IO jurisdictions. By allowing trademark-based GIs to wither
on the vine, while ensuring protection for AOOs strongly rooted in a
particular place in the manner commended by the above analysis, the
fragmented and fractious disjunctures that mark the current era of
glocalization may be stemmed, resulting in greater harmony and comity in
international IO law.

